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Abstract 
It is well known that ad valorem taxes welfare-dominate speciﬁc taxes under monopoly. This paper demonstrates that the
comparative welfare ranking of the two instruments reverses under monopsony. The relative performance of alternative tax
forms is thus highly sensitive to whether the buyer or seller has market power. 
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1. Introduction 
A familiar and oft-cited result on tax efﬁciency in noncompetitive environments is the superior
performance of an ad valorem tax over an equal-yield speciﬁc tax. While it is well known that the two
taxes yield identical outcomes in perfectly competitive environments, Wicksell (1950, originally
published in 1896) and later Suits and Musgrave (1953) demonstrate that an ad valorem tax welfare
dominates an equal-yield speciﬁc tax in the monopoly case. Recently, Delipalla and Keen (1992)
extend this result to various circumstances of homogeneous product oligopoly and Skeath and Trandel
(1994) strengthen the claim by establishing the superiority of ad valorem over speciﬁc taxes under a
more stringent welfare criterion of Pareto optimality. This paper demonstrates that the welfare
domination of an ad valorem tax over an equal-yield speciﬁc tax, while true under monopoly and
oligopoly, fails to hold under monopsony.
The basic argument for the welfare dominance of an ad valorem tax centers on the relative
efﬁciency with which ad valorem and speciﬁc taxes achieve a given transfer of revenue. That is, for a
given speciﬁc tax imposed on a monopoly, it is possible to ﬁnd an ad valorem tax that raises the same
amount of revenue but that results in greater equilibrium output and, therefore, greater welfare. The
following section demonstrates that the welfare ranking of the two policy instruments reverses under 
monopsony. For a given ad valorem tax levied on a monopsony, an equal-yield speciﬁc tax results in
greater equilibrium output and greater welfare. Hence, the comparative efﬁciency of ad valorem and
speciﬁc taxes does not yield global welfare implications in noncompetitive environments: the relative
efﬁciency of the taxes depends critically on whether it is the buyer or seller who has market power. 
2. The model 
The following comparative efﬁciency analysis is based on two primary cases. The ﬁrst case, that of
a monopoly seller, is the situation typically considered in the literature. The second case, that of a
monopsony buyer, is analogous to the ﬁrst situation and has remained, perhaps for this reason,
relatively unexplored.
Comparative efﬁciency results are derived by examining the relative yields of an ad valorem tax
and a speciﬁc tax that result in the same ﬁnal output and price. It follows directly that the higher
yielding tax is associated with greater equilibrium output and greater welfare for a given amount of
revenue collected. 
Let R(Y) denote the tax yield associated with a given level of output, Y. Under a speciﬁc tax, 
u u u aR(Y) 5 t Y  and R (Y) 5 t , where t is the speciﬁc tax rate. Under an ad valorem tax, R(Y) 5 t P(Y)YY a aand R (Y) 5 t [P(Y) 1 YPY(Y)], where P(Y) is the market price schedule and t is the ad valorem tax Y 
rate. 
Next, consider an industry subject to taxation in which an economic agent i sells a certain product 
to a second agent j. For a given market quantity, agent i incurs production costs of C(Y), with 
C (Y) . 0 and C (Y) . 0, while agent j receives total beneﬁts of B(Y), with B (Y) . 0 and Y YY Y 
B (Y) , 0. The welfare criterion is the standard Marshallian surplus measure, W(Y) 5 B(Y) 2 C(Y).YY 
Case 1. Consider the case in which agent i is a monopolist and agent j behaves competitively. In this 
case, the proﬁt of agent i is 
p i(Y) 5 P(Y)Y 2 C(Y) 2 R(Y), (1) 
where the market price schedule, P(Y), is the marginal beneﬁt function (i.e., inverse demand function) 
of agent j, 
P(Y) 5 B (Y). (2)Y 
Substituting (2) into (1), the ﬁrst-order necessary condition for a maximum is 
B (Y) 1 YB (Y) 2 C (Y) 5 R(Y). (3) Y YY Y 
Let Y* denote the equilibrium level of output deﬁned by (3). A comparison of ad valorem and speciﬁc
taxes at Y* must equate the marginal revenue transfer, R (Y*), between the two policy instruments, Y
which implies 
u at 5 t [B (Y*) 1 Y*B (Y*)]. (4) Y YY 
u uThe yield under a speciﬁc tax is R (Y*) 5 t Y*, which, using (2) and (4), equals 
a a 2 a a 2t Y*B (Y*) 1 t (Y*) B (Y*) 5 R (Y*) 1 t (Y*) B (Y*). Y YY YY 
Therefore, 
u a a 2R (Y*) 2 R (Y*) 5 t (Y*) B (Y*) , 0, (5) YY 
where the inequality follows from the concavity of the beneﬁt function. Expression (5) indicates that
the yield under an ad valorem tax exceeds that under a speciﬁc tax at a given equilibrium price and
quantity. Equivalently, an ad valorem tax is associated with greater output and a lower market price
relative to an equal-yield speciﬁc tax. This argument is the basis of the familiar conclusion that an ad
valorem tax welfare dominates an equal-yield speciﬁc tax under monopoly. 
Case 2. Next consider the case in which agent i behaves competitively and agent j is a monopsonist. 
In this case, the proﬁt of agent j is 
p j(Y) 5 B(Y) 2 P(Y)Y 2 R(Y), (6) 
where the market price schedule, P(Y), is the marginal cost function (i.e., inverse supply function) of 
agent i, 
P(Y) 5 C (Y). (7)Y 
Substituting (7) into (6), the ﬁrst-order necessary condition for a maximum is 
B (Y) 2 C (Y) 2 YC (Y) 5 R (Y). (8) Y Y YY Y 
If Y* denotes the monopsony output level associated with (8), then, for alternative speciﬁcations of
the tax instrument, it must be true that 
u at 5 t [C (Y*) 1 Y*C (Y*)]. (9) Y YY 
u uThe yield under a speciﬁc tax is given by R (Y*) 5 t Y*, by which (7) and (9) equals 
a a 2 a a 2t Y*C (Y*) 1 t (Y*) C (Y*) 5 R (Y*) 1 t (Y*) C (Y*). Y YY YY 
Therefore, 
u a a 2R (Y*) 2 R (Y*) 5 t (Y*) C (Y*) . 0, (10) YY 
where the inequality follows from the convexity of the cost function. It follows directly from (10) that
a speciﬁc tax welfare dominates an ad valorem tax under monopsony. Because the market price under
monopsony is identiﬁed with the inverse supply function, as opposed to the inverse demand function
under monopoly, an increase in the quantity purchased by a monopsonist increases the marginal tax 
rate, which thereby reverses the comparative ranking of the taxes. 
3. Policy implications 
The reversal of the welfare ranking in the monopoly and monopsony cases is rather intuitive. A
monopolist does not have a supply function and thus perceives the effect of a change in output on the
tax rate to be determined by the market demand function. Conversely, a monopsonist does not have a
demand function and thus perceives the effect of a change in output on the tax rate to be determined
by the market supply function. As a result, an ad valorem tax, which assesses a marginal tax rate that
varies with the equilibrium market price, increases the elasticity of the after-tax demand function
under monopoly but makes the after-tax supply function more inelastic under monopsony.
The relative performance of ad valorem and speciﬁc taxes in noncompetitive environments thus
hinges on whether the market price schedule is given by a market supply or market demand function.
The conventional wisdom that an ad valorem tax welfare dominates an equal-yield speciﬁc tax under
imperfect competition is true only if the seller is the agent with market power. If, instead, the buyer
has market power, then a speciﬁc tax welfare dominates an equal-yield ad valorem tax. 
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